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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. COURT REDEFINES THE MAIN PURPOSE RULE AND ELIMINATES THE
I EQUITABLE CLEAN-UP DOCTRINE
In Floyd v. Floyd' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that,
when a plaintiff asserts both legal and equitable claims in a complaint,
a jury should decide the legal issues2 and the court should decide the
equitable issues.3 The court noted that the primary function of the "main
purpose" doctrine4 is to "administratively categorize" an action contain-
ing both legal and equitable relief.5 The court expressed concern that
equity judges applying the main purpose rule had begun to rule on purely
legal issues.6 Accordingly, the supreme court questioned three of its
recent decisions7 and adopted the approach of Island Car Wash, Inc. v.
Norris.8 Although the Floyd court did not expressly discuss the issue, the
holding effectively invalidates the "equitable clean-up doctrine"9 in
South Carolina.
1. 412 S.E.2d 397 (S.C. 1991).
2. In South Carolina a party must demand a jury trial. S.C. R. CiV. P. 38(d).
3. Floyd, 412 S.E.2d at 399.
4. After the merger of law and equity, courts utilized the main purpose doctrine
to determine whether a cause of action was primarily legal or equitable. If the main
purpose of the complaint was legal, the matter was placed on the jury roster. On the
other hand, if the complaint raised primarily equitable issues, the matter was referred
to the equity side of the court. See generally John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid
and Non-Hybrid Actions: The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine in the Guise of
Inseparability and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAL L. RaV. 627 (1989)
(discussing use of the equitable clean-up doctrine before and after the merger of law
and equity).
5. Floyd, 412 S.E.2d at 399.
6. Id.
7. Baughman v. AT & T, 298 S.C. 127, 378 S.E.2d 599 (1989); Collins Music
Co. v. Ingram, 285 S.C. 108, 328 S.E.2d 477 (1985); Johnson v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 285 S.C. 80, 328 S.E.2d 75 (1985).
8. 292 S.C. 595, 358 S.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1987), adopted by Floyd, 412
S.E.2d at 399.
9. The "equitable clean-up doctrine" allows an equity court with proper
jurisdiction to dispose completely of an action, including deciding legal issues and
granting legal relief. Several South Carolina cases have employed this doctrine, see,
e.g., Alderman v. Cooper, 257 S.C. 304, 185 S.E.2d 809 (1971) (per curiam);
Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956); Parker Peanut Co. v.
Felder, 207 S.C. 63, 34 S.E.2d 488 (1945); however none of these cases have
expressly adopted the term "equitable clean-up doctrine." The term is used, however,
in jurisdictions throughout the United States. See, e.g., Burris v. Cross, 583 A.2d
1364 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); Higgins v. Barnes, 530 A.2d 724 (Md. 1987); Jarvill
v. City of Eugene, 594 P.2d 1261 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (en banc), aff'd and modified,
613 P.2d 1 (Or.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980).
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The plaintiffs in Floyd, siblings acting individually and as sharehold-
ers of J.F. Floyd Mortuary, Inc., brought suit against the mortuary,
several of its shareholders and officers, and the executrix of their uncle's
estate. Alleging numerous separate causes of action, the plaintiffs sought
both legal and equitable relief.10 The defendants denied the material
allegations of the complaint and moved to have the court transfer the
entire action to the master-in-equity or to the nonjury calendar for
determination." The trial judge granted the motion and transferred the
case to the nonjury calendar.
The trial judge considered the case in its entirety and concluded that
the legal remedies sought were secondary to, and dependant upon, the
equitable relief demanded; therefore, under the main purpose doctrine the
entire case should be tried in a court of equity.' 2 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed, asserting that the trial judge erred in concluding that they were
not entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues.13
In reversing the trial court's decision, the supreme court relied on
its pre-1978 cases, which recognized that legal and equitable issues are
separable and should be decided respectively by a jury, if demanded, and
a judge.' 4 The Floyd court expressed concern that "the pendulum
appears to have swung with steadied progress toward decisions tending
to place within the sole purview of the equity judge issues properly
triable only by jury."'" Therefore, the court cited Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover 6 and Rule 38 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
10. Floyd, 412 S.E.2d at 398. The plaintiffs demanded, among other forms of
relief, actual damages, punitive damages, appointment of a receiver, rescission of a
contract, and an injunction. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The trial court relied on four recent South Carolina Supreme Court
decisions: Baughman v. AT & T, 298 S.C. 127, 378 S.E.2d 599 (1989); Collins
Music Co. v. Lightsey, 285 S.C. 108, 328 S.E.2d 477 (1985); Johnson v. South
Carolina National Bank, 285 S.C. 80, 328 S.E.2d 75 (1985); and Insurance Financial
Services, Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 271 S.C. 289, 247 S.E.2d 315
(1978). Floyd, 412 S.E.2d at 398.
13. Floyd, 412 S.E.2d at 398.
14. Id. at 398-99 (citing Airfare, Inc. v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 249 S.C.
265, 153 S.E.2d 846 (1967); Winter v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 240 S.C.
561, 126 S.E.2d 724 (1962); Spencer v. National Union Bank, 192 S.C. 355, 6
S.E.2d 755 (1940); Greenville v. Ormand, 44 S.C. 119, 21 S.E. 642 (1895)).
15. Id. at 399.
16. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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dure"7 and concluded that the main purpose doctrine mandates the use
of a jury in an action that presents legal issues.'"
An analysis of South Carolina case law prior to Johnson v. South
Carolina National Bank9 reveals a dual function of the main purpose
doctrine: First, the doctrine aids courts in construing the language of a
complaint; and second, it guides courts in determining whether the legal
or equitable issues should be adjudicated first. In Alford v. Martin20 the
South Carolina Supreme Court noted that "[tihe character of an action is
determined by the complaint in its main purpose and broad outlines and
not merely by allegations that are merely incidental."21
When a complaint asserts facts supporting either a legal or equitable
cause of action, the court employs the main purpose rule to construe the
ambiguous language and properly classify the action as legal or equitable.
For example, in Ogilvie v. Smith,' the complaint asserted two causes
of action: the first was clearly at law,' however, the second cause of
action raised issues that could have supported an action at law or
equity.' Relying on Alford's articulation of the main purpose rule, the
Ogilvie court held that the language of the complaint raised primarily
equitable issues; therefore, the court, not the jury, should decide the
17. S.C. R. Civ. P. 38(a). Rule 38(a) provides:
The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as given by
a statute of South Carolina shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
Issues of fact in an action for the recovery of money only or of specific
real or personal property must be tried by a jury, unless a trial be waived.
Id. In Insurance Financial Services, Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 271 S.C.
289, 247 S.E.2d 315 (1978), the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the
predecessor to Rule 38(a), S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-23-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976), the
language of which is identical to that of rule 38(a). The court held that section 15-23-
60 does not guarantee the right to a jury trial if an action raises both legal and
equitable issues because the section applies only to actions for the recovery of money.
Insurance Fin. Servs., 271 S.C. at 292-93, 247 S.E.2d at 317. Floyd apparently
overrules this interpretation of the rule by mandating jury determination of legal
issues.
18. Floyd, 412 S.E.2d at 399.
19. 285 S.C. 80, 328 S.E.2d 75 (1985).
20. 176 S.C. 207, 180 S.E. 13 (1935).
21. Id. at 212, 180 S.E. at 15.
22. 215 S.C. 300, 54 S.E.2d 860 (1949).
23. Id. at 305, 54 S.E.2d at 862. The plaintiff sought $2,500 in actual damages
for the defendant's breach of promise to marry her. Id. at 303, 54 S.E.2d at 861.
24. Id. at 305, 54 S.E.2d at 862. The facts asserted in the second cause of action
supported an action for either damages or the imposition of a constructive trust. Id.
[Vol. 44
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second cause of action.' Nevertheless, the main purpose rule "does not
deprive litigants of the right to a jury trial where appropriate. "26
The rule also serves an important procedural function when a
complaint asserts distinct legal and equitable causes of action. In such a
case, a court uses the main purpose rule to determine whether the legal
issues are primary or subordinate to the equitable issues.' If the legal
issues predominate, those issues will be decided first by a jury; the judge
will then decide the equitable issues. However, the main purpose rule
does not allow a court to aggregate distinct legal and equitable issues into
one action and then assign that action to a court of equity for full
determination of the legal issues simply because the equitable issues are
dominant. Instead, the equitable clean-up doctrine gives an equity court
this power."
Prior to the merger of law and equity, if a complaint contained both
legal and equitable issues, parties were forced to assert their claims either
on the equity or law side of the court, or bring'two separate causes of
action. In the interest of judicial economy and fairness to the parties,
equity courts developed the clean-up doctrine to decide legal and
equitable issues in the same action.29 Although the merger of law and
25. Id. at 305-06, 54 S.E.2d at 862-63. The court also noted: "'In a case where
it is material or necessary to determine which of two different remedies arising upon
the same state of facts a party has elected to pursue, undoubtedly, the prayer for
relief may be considered at least as tending to indicate which remedy the plaintiff
elected.'" Id. at 305-06, 54 S.E.2d at 862 (quoting Speizman v. Guill, 202 S.C. 498,
515, 25 S.E.2d 731, 737 (1943)).
26. Floyd v. Floyd, 412 S.E.2d 397, 399 (S.C. 1991).
27. Although the Floyd court did not expressly make this conclusion, the court
stated that the main purpose doctrine "reduces the complexity of litigation." Id. at
399. In Standard Warehouse Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 222 S.C. 93,
71 S.E.2d 893 (1952), the court stated that "[w]here a case contains both legal and
equity issues, it is discretionary with the trial Judge as to which shall be tried first,
and ordinarily that one is tried first which is more likely to aid in deciding the entire
controversy." Id. at 103, 71 S.E.2d at 895; accord Johnson v. South Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 292 S.C. 51, 354 S.E.2d 895 (1987) (per curiam); Airfare, Inc. v. Greenville
Airport Comm'n, 249 S.C. 265, 153 S.E.2d 846 (1967). However, the Johnson court
noted that when the judge orders separate trials of the legal and equitable issues and
there are facts common to both claims, the legal claims must be tried first "absent
the 'most imperative circumstances.'" Johnson, 292 S.C. at 56, 354 S.E.2d at 897
(quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v, Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959)).
28. For a discussion of the equitable clean-up doctrine, see supra note 9.
29. See generally Sanchez, supra note 4.
1992]
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equity presumably eliminated the need for the clean-up doctrine, the
South Carolina Supreme Court continued to condone its use.30
Floyd, however, effectively invalidates the doctrine. In fact, Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westove?' impliedly holds that the equitable clean-up
doctrine is unconstitutional: the right to a jury trial cannot be "'impaired
by any blending with a claim, properly cognizable at law, of a demand
for equitable relief in aid of the legal action or during its pendency. "'32
Moreover, the Floyd court made no qualifications or exceptions to its
holding that juries should decide legal issues and courts equity issues.33
Arguably, this language includes any and all legal issues before a court
of equity under the clean-up doctrine.
In clarifying the proper scope and application of the main purpose
doctrine, Floyd effectively abandons a power invalidated in the federal
system in 1959. Once a jury trial is demanded, the right to a jury
determination of all legal issues cannot be usurped by a court of equity
acting under the equitable clean-up doctrine.
Simpson Zimmerman Fant
30. See, e.g., Collins Music Co. v. Ingram, 285 S.C. 108, 328 S.E.2d 477
(1985); Johnson v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 285 S.C. 80, 328 S.E.2d 75 (1985);
Insurance Fin. Servs., Inc. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 289, 247 S.E.2d
315 (1978). Although Floyd implies that these three holdings misapply the main
purpose rule, each of these cases actually involves the equitable clean-up doctrine.
31. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
32. Id. at 510 (quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 110 (1891)).
33. But cf. Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 693, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316
(1978) (relying on S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 in finding that the "right of jury trial
shall be preserved only in those cases in which the parties were entitled to it under
the law or practice existing at the time of the adoption of the constitution").
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